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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MARINDA DAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

LORENZO SMITH & SON, INC., a
Utah corporation,

10256

Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out of
an automobile collision that occurred on September 11, 1961,
on U. S. 91, 4.3 miles north of Nephi, Utah, in which the
plaintiff suffered injuries to her back, requiring two operations.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury. The court submitted
a special verdict to the jury in the form of five questions
and upon the basis of answers given to the special verdict,
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the court ordered the clerk to enter judgment, no cause of
action, which was done accordingly. Plaintiff made motion
for judgment n. o. v. or in the alternative for a new trial
which was denied, from which plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment in
the court below and for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant will be hereafter referred to as
plaintiff and defendant-respondent will hereafter be ref erred to as defendant.
On the morning of September 11, 1961, two vehicles
approached an aocident scene from opposite directions on
U. S. 91, 4.3 miles north of Nephi, Utah. A Utah highway
patrolman, Eldon Sherwood, was at the accident scene
completing his investigation (R. 176). The accident involved a rollover of a foreign car that came to rest on the
west shoulder of the highway, a few feet onto the hard
surface (R. 344, Exh. P-2 and D-4). The weather was
clear (R. 138) and the road was a two lane asphalt highway (R. 139).
Plaintiff Marinda Day, a 47 year old housewife, (R.
231) was a passenger in the vehicle proceeding north (R.
216, 231). It was a 1949 Chevrolet pick-up truck driven
by a friend, Larry Roberts, age 16, (R. 214) and owned by
Ted Davis (R. 181, 215). Plaintiff was on her way to
Provo to pick up some glasses and Larry offered to give

s
her a ride (R. 215, 230). The Robert's truck was followed
by a sheriff's car driven by Juab County Sheriff Ray Jackson (R. 139).
The other vehicle proceeding south was a 1961 Corvair
box truck (red Greenbriar) owned by defendant corporation, Lorenzo Smith & Son (R. 181) and driven by an employee, Joseph Ivy Mitchell (R. 143). Defendant, in its answer to the complaint, admitted agency of its employee
(R. 4). Mr. Mitchell has since died from causes not associated with this accident.
The two vehicles came upon the accident scene and
sideswiped each other (R. 224). After impact, the Robert's
truck careened some distance down the right or east side
of the highway, turned sideways and skidded, and then
rolled one complete turn and came to rest 310 .feet north
of the collision on the east shoulder (R. 177, 178). Defendant's vehicle travelled south approximately 150 feet and
pulled off on the right hand side of the road (R. 178). The
ultimate question for the jury was which vehicle was in
the wrong lane of traffic at the time of impact.
Patrolman Sherwood found plaintiff lying on her back
on the pavement near the Robert's truck complaining of
severe pain (R. 178). She suffered back and neck injuries
and subsequently had two operations fusing vertabrae in
her lower back (R. 277) and neck (R. 284) with permanent disability (R. 290).
Plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in (a)
failing to maintain a proper lookout, and in (b) driving
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left of the center of the highway into the path of the vehide in which plaintiff was riding (R. 41, 42). Six eye.
witnesses to the accident appeared at the trial. Four of
these witnesses testified the impact occurred in the east
lane (plaintiff's side) of the highway: Desmond Naismith
(R. 194), Larry Roberts (R. 218), Marinda Day (R. 232)
and Marion Brown (R. 322), a telephone company employee who was standing by the Naismith car at the time
of the accident. Another witness, Helen Naismith, saw
defendant's vehicle drive over on the white line shortly before impact, but did not see the collision (R. 212). Defendant produced two witnesses who testified the impact occurred in the west lane (defendant's side) of the highway:
Henry Kelly (R. 339) and his son Robert (R. 384). The
special verdict submitted to the jury was answered as follows:
Question No. 1: Was Joseph Ivy Mitchell negligent
in one or more of the particulars claimed by Mrs.
Day, viz.,
(a) By failing to keep a proper lookout for other
vehicles upon the highway (R. 41)?
Answer: Yes.
Signed by 6 jurors.
(b) By driving to the left of the center of the highway?
Answer: No preponderance.
Signed by 6 jurors.
Question No. 2 : If you answered "Yes" to either
(a) or (b) above, do you further find that su.ch
negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries

sustained by Mrs. Day?
Answer to (a) above No.
Signed by 6 jurors.
Answer to ( b) above............ (No answer)
Signed by no jurors.
Question No. 3 : Was Mrs. Day negligent as claimed
by Lorenzo Smith and Son in failing to advise her
driver to slow down immediately prior to the collision (R. 42) ?
Answer: No she was not negligent.
Signed by 8 jurors.
Question No. 4 : If you found negligence in Question No. 3, was it a proximate cause of the injuries
sustained by Mrs. Day?
Answer: No.
No jurors signed.
Question No. 5: (a) As shown by a preponderance
of the evidence in this case, what amount of money
would fairly and adequately recompense Mrs. Day
for any and all pain and suffering and loss of bodily function which was occasioned to her as a result
of injuries which she received from the collision in
question?
Answer: $60,000.00.
Signed by 8 jurors.
(b) (1) Has Mrs. Day sustained any loss of earning capacity as a result of the injuries she received
in the collision?
Answer: Yes.
(2) If so, what has been the diminution in her
income per year?
Answer: $450.00.
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(3) For how many years will the diminution
continue (R. 43)?
Answer: 5 years.
Signed by 8 jurors.
Special damages were stipulated by counsel in
the sum of $3,125.20.
The court thereupon entered judgment in favor of the
defendant, no cause of action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
HIGHWAY PATROLMAN TO GIVE HIS OPINION AS TO THE POINT OF IMPACT.
Investigation by counsel before trial revealed that the
two police officers had developed varied and conflicting
opinions as to which side of the highway the impact occurred. However, these opinions were not based upon an
examination of the physical evidence at the scene (R. 145,
181). Sheriff Jackson was of the opinion that the accident
occurred in the east portion of the highway while patrol·
man Sherwood judged that it occurred in the west portion.
Whether these opinions would be admissible at the trial
was a crucial question since the subject was the pivotal
issue of the case and the opinion of a police officer OC(!UPY·
ing an official position would greatly impress the jury.
Plaintiff elected to call Sheriff Jackson as her first
witness. He testified that the point of impact could not
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be determined from an investigation of the physical evidence at the scene of the accident.
"Q. Were you able to determine the point of
collision that these cars had?"
"A. No."

Why not?"
"A. There was no marks on the highway
other than the debris, which covered a large area.
Now, this debris was glass and dirt, and there was
no point that I - we could determine or I could determine where the point of impact were and where
one car was in relationship to the other car. The
first marks laid down by any vehicle was the Robert's car after it left the scene, and if you don't
mind, I will show you where they started."
"Q.

"Q. Please do" (R. 145).
"A. The marks of the Robert's car extended
from its position down into about this area, something like that, and these were the only marks that
you could find indicating where the impact occurred. Could not tie it down."

And on which lane of the highway were
those marks?"
"A. On the right-hand side facing north, or
on the extreme - on the east side of the highway."
"Q.

"Q. Did those marks extend to any - from
any point over on to the west side of the highway?"

"A.

No they did not" (R. 146).

Sheriff Jackson testified that he examined the marks
on the highway in the company of highway patrolman
Sherwood and the patrolman could not find a point of impact from an investigation of the physical evidence.

"A. And officer Sherwood requested them to
take some pictures because I always carry cameras,
and I said, 'Yes, come down and show me where the
point of impact is'; and he says, 'You can't find the
point of impact'; and he walked down with me, and
then he pointed out these - or the skid marks. This
is the oil, and this is this - caused in the first accident by this Volkswagen, and I think the people
were from Canada, and they had tripped over going
down the road, and then he pointed out to me that
the glass and dust and debris, this came from the
second accident, and we both examined the highway
very carefully together, and we both agreed I
thought at the point - at least I agreed that I could
not tie that point of impact down to any one par·
ticular segment of the highway, and then I went
back and shot the photographs that are here" (R.
153).
Then, on direct examination, Sheriff Jackson volunteered an opinion based upon the marks he found on the
east side of the highway and the Court excluded this testimony upon objection by defendant's counsel.
All right. Now, I believe you indicated
that there were marks on the highway running
from the Robert's vehicle."
"Q.

"A.

That's right."

"Q. And all of these marks were on the east
side of the highway" (R. 155)?

"A. That's right. This vehicle - from the
marks I would be of the opinion that the vehicle -"
"MR. NEBEKER: I object your Honor, to any
opinion given by the officer."
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"THE COURT: Yes."
"MR. NEBEKER: I think he ought to confine
himself to what he saw."
"THE COURT: Just tell what you saw."
"MR. BEESLEY: Certainly."

"A. I saw the marks leading directly from the
Robert's car back along the highway to the south
for quite some distance, and they were quite wide
apart, wider than would be made by the normal, oh,
skidding of a car going down the highway straight,
and then they ceased. All these marks were on the
east side of the highway" (R. 156) .
Plaintiff then called patrolman Sherwood. In so doing,
plaintiff vouched for the patrolman's credibility when she
put him on the stand, but she had the right to assume that
he would not be permitted to give improper testimony,
Chester v. Shockley (1957 Mo.) 304 S. W. 2d 831, especially in view of the court's previous ruling excluding the opinion of sheriff Jackson. Patrolman Sherwood testified that
he did not see the collision.

"A. The noise was more to my rear and to my
right, so I just turned to the right and saw this
Davies (Roberts) vehicle taking off down the pavement on the right or east side of the highway, (R.
177) and it traveled some distance, and then it
turned sideways and skidded and then rolled one
complete turn."
"Q.

I see. You didn't then see the collision?"

"A.

No" (R. 178).
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Patrolman Sherwood found no skidmarks by either
vehicle prior to the impact and the Robert's vehicle was
the only car to leave any marks on the road after impact
(R. 179). Patrolman Sherwood corroborated the testimony
of Sheriff Jackson that there was no objective evidence
whatsoever to determine the point of impact.
"Q. I see. Now, were there any objective
signs whatsoever to determine the point of collision?"

"A.

No."

"MR. NEBEKER: I will object to that, Your
Honor. I think he can state what he saw and let
the jury decide."
"THE COURT: Well, since he says no, I guess
we don't have to pursue it further."
"MR. BEESLEY: I don't intend to, Your Honor" (R. 181).
Then, on cross examination, counsel for defendant
elicited from the patrolman the improper testimony complained of in this appeal. The patrolman was asked his
opinion as to the point of impact. The court had previously
excluded sheriff Jackson's opinion but now chose to admit
testimony of that same nature from patrolman Sherwood
by distinguishing between the terms "opinion" evidence
and "judgment" evidence.
"Q. From your examination of the road, you
made a determination as to the approximate point
of impact, did you not?"

"A.

Yes."
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"Q. Was that point of impact on the east or
the west side of (R. 182) the road?"

"A. It was near the center line, and my best
opinion, it may have been -"
"MR. BEESLEY: I will object to any opinion,
Your Honor."
"THE COURT: Well, you may give your judgment. If you are giving us an opinion, he would be
right. If you mean by your opinion your best judgment as to what you judge it would be, I think you
might proceed, Sergeant, and I don't quite know -"
"Q.

Give us your judgment."

"MR. BEESLEY: Make the same objection,
Your Honor."
"THE COURT: Let's find out if he has a judgment or giving an opinion. If he is giving an opinion, he can't."
"Q. Do you have a judgment as to where the
point of impact occurred?"

"A.

Yes."

"Q.

Will you tell us what the judgment is?"

"MR. BEESLEY: Objection, Your Honor."
"THE COURT: It's overruled. He may give
his judgment."
"A. As near the center line and probably a
little bit west."
"MR. BEESLEY: I object to any probability,
Your Honor."
"THE COURT: If you are confining it to your
judgment -"
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"Q.

Just give us your best judgment."

"THE COURT: You can tell us your judg.
ment."
"MR. BEESLEY: I believe he said the center
line."
"A.

Near the center line" (R. 183).

"Q. Was it on the west or the east of the
center line?"

"A.

Do I have to answer that 'yes' or 'no'?"

"Q.

Yes."

"A.

My opinion is no good?"

"Q.

Just give us your judgment."

"THE COURT: You can give us your judgment, Sergeant."
"A. My judgment, slightly to the west of the
center line."
"Q. Would you say it was about a foot to the
west of the center line?"

"A.

I think that would be a fair figure."

"Q. It could have been a little .further west?
It could have been a little further east?"

"A.

Yes" (R. 184).

Plaintiff submits that a distinction between the two
terms "opinion" and "judgment" was indistinguishable to
counsel, the witness, or to members of the jury. In 29
Words and Phrases 595, these two terms are held to be
synonymous.
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"Best judgment means substantially the same
thing as opinion or belief." Harris v. State, (Tex.)
137 s. w. 373, 376.
More often than otherwise, the question of the admissibility of expert opinion evidence in an action for damages
arising out of highway accidents has involved testimony
by highway patrolmen, sheriffs, deputies, police officers or
other public officials who viewed the facts and circumstances at the scene after the accident occurred and gave
their opinion as to what happened. The courts are sharply
divided numerically and otherwise respecting the admissibility of evidence of this kind. See notes to Tuck v. Buller
( 1957 Okla.) , 66 A. L. R. 2d 1043. Cases supplementing
this 1958 annotation indicate a trend to exclude such opinions. Counsel for plaintiff is unaware of any Utah cases
directly considering the question.
This point presents four basis issues for consideration:
(1) Is the point of impact a proper subject matter for expert opinion evidence by a highway patrolman? (2) Assuming point of impact is a proper subject matter for expert opinion evidence, is such an opinion admissible when
based upon some source other than competent facts? (3)
Assuming point of impact is a proper subject matter for
expert opinion evidence, was it error for the court to admit
in evidence the opinion of patrolman Sherwood after excluding the opinion of sheriff Jackson? (4) If the admission of the highway patrolman's opinion was error, was
such error prejudicial?
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Is the point of impact a proper subject matter
for expert opinion evidence by a highway patrolman?
It is a fundamental principle of the law of evidence as
administered by our courts, that testimony at a trial upon
matters within the scope of the common knowledge and
experience of mankind must generally be confined to statements of concrete facts within the observation, knowledge,
and recollection of the witness as distinguished from their
opinions, impressions, judgments or conclusions drawn
from such facts. However, when the jury is confronted
with issues, the proper understanding of which requires
specialized knowledge or experience and which cannot be
determined intelligently merely by deductions made and
inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge and
practical experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life,
then there is created a necessity for skilled or expert witnesses to be permitted to give opinion testimony (20 Am.
Jur. § 765). Such testimony should not be admitted unless its admission is demanded by the necessity of the individual case, but unless the subject of inquiry relates to some
trade, profession, science, or art, it is within the province
of the jury to form their own opinion and not of witnesses,
although experts, to express theirs. The rule is clearly de·
fined in 20 Am. Jur. § 780:
(1)

"The rule permitting opm10ns of expert witnesses to be given in evidence is chiefly applicable
to cases in which, from their very nature, the facts
disconnected from such opinions cannot be clearly
presented to the jury so as to enable them to pass
thereon with the requisite knowledge and informed
judgment. The governing rule deductible from the
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adjudicated cases seems to be that the subject must
be one of science or skill, or one of which observation and experience have given the opportunity and
means of knowledge which exists in reason rather
than descriptive facts, and, hence, cannot be intelligently communicated to others not familiar with
the subject so as to possess themselves of a full
understanding of it. Expert testimony is admissible
only where, by reason of peculiar skill and experience, inferences can be drawn from facts which an
ordinary untrained mind cannot deduce, or where
such testimony relates to a subject which is not
within the average experience and common sense
of the jury. Expert opinion testimony is never admissible where the subject is one of common knowledge as to which facts can be intelligently described
to the jury and understood by them, and they can
form a reasonable opinion for themselves. Furthermore, the facts on which an expert opinion is based
must permit of reasonably certain deductions as distinguished from mere conjectures."
In a manslaughter case, the Utah Supreme Court held
that a highway patrolman could not state his opinion as to
causation where the facts were neither complicated nor
technical. State v. Bleazard, ( 1943) 103 Utah 113, 133 P.
2d 1000. In that case the state called the patrolman to
identify a map containing measurements and attempting
to locate the point of impact. On cross examination, he was
asked by counsel for defendant if, in his opinion, it was
not possible and probable that the crash of another car
caused the death of deceased and not the impact with defendant's vehicle. Counsel for the state objected that the
question was not subject to opinion evidence and the trial
court sustained the objection. On appeal, the exclusion was
sustained in the following language:
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"The facts upon which his opinion would have
been based were all before the jury. They were
neither complicated nor technical so as to require
interpretation by an expert. Under those circumstances, a witness may not be permitted to give an
opinion. It is not the province of a witness to act ,
as a judge or jury, and questions calling for his ;
opinion should be so framed as to not call upon him
to determine controverted questions of fact or to
pass upon the preponderance of testimony."
The general rule concerning the application and admissibility of expert opinion testimony in point of impact
cases is stated in 9 C Blashfield Cyc. of Automobile Law
and Practice, Perm. Ed. Sec. 6311 :
"Normally, expert testimony is inadmissible to
show how and where an accident took plaice, or the
position of the automobile."
The landmark decision to rule that the point of impact
was not so technical and complicated a subject matter as
to require opinion evidence in a.ccident cases is Beckman
v. Schroeder, (1947 Minn.) 28 N. W. 2d 629. The rule established in Beckman has found wide support and comment
in a majority of the states and the Supreme Court of Min·
nesota has repeatedly reexamined its basis for rejection of
opinion evidence of this nature. Murphey v. Hennon, (1963
Minn.) 119 N. W. 2d 489; Carmody v. Aho (1957 Minn.)
86 N. W. 2d 692. In Beckman, the trial court received the
opinion testimony of a sheriff and highway patrolman, over
objection, concerning point of impact. On appeal, the court
stated, p. 637:

1
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"In this case, in determining whether the accident happened on the other side of the center line,
the jury was as competent to make the decision as
an opinion witness. No superior knowledge was required. The debris was practically all south of the
center line; the Schroeder car was several feet south
of the south slab of the pavement when it came to
rest after the collision; the front of the Hertzgaarde
car was over the center line into the south lane several feet. In our opinion, the jury was as competent
to determine where this collision took place as the
experts, and the place where this accident occurred
is the crucial question in this case. No doubt the
official position of these experts carried great
weight with the jury in locating the place of the
collision in the north lane."

Murphey v. Hennon, supra, involved two police officers stating their opinion as to point of impact. The court
held, p. 493 :

"* * * It is settled by our decisions that
the opinion of a police officer as to the point of impact of a collision is not admissible because such
opinion is usually not based on any special skill,
learning, or experience but is simply the judgment
of the officer based on facts or assumptions ordinarily possessed by persons of common intelligence.
The vice of admitting such testimony is that it permits the jury to substitute the opinion of the officer
for the combined judgment of the jury, to which
parties are entitled. Even though it may be rather
common practice for adversaries to agree that such
opinions be received, especially from experienced
and dedicated traffic officers, the mischief of having the rule conform to the practice is that it encourages trial by experts rather than by witnesses,
* * * Moreover, receiving such opinions fost-

us
ers the loose practice of receiving (as was done in
this case) opinions not based wholly upon facts or
data perceived by, or personally known or made
known to, the witness at trial, but also upon hearsay and instinct. We, therefore, hold that it was
error to receive these opinions * * * "
Some states have applied slight modification or variation to the Minnesota rule but with the same result. In
Thomas v. Dad's Root Beer and Canada Dry Bottling Company, ( 1960 Oregon) 356 P. 2d 418, 419, the court ~om
pared opinion evidence on point of impact to its decisions
rejecting opinion evidence on rate of speed by a person not
an eyewitness to the accident:

"* * * one not an eyewitness to an accident cannot give his opinion of the rate of speed
based upon physical facts at the scene of the accident, because the jury is as well able to draw its
own inferences and form its own opinion from the
facts presented as is the witness. * * * The
rule that such testimony is inadmissible is salutary
and should apply also to testimony from one not an
eyewitness to the accident concerning the point of
impact upon the highway."
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the case of City
of Milwaukee v. Bub (1962 Wisc.) 118 N. W. 2d 123, 127,
holds that opinions by one not an eyewitness concerning
point of impact is a subject matter reserved for physicists
or engineers and not a police officer:
"It takes a high degree of training, plus ex·
perience, to become an expert on the complex prob·
lem of where an impact occurs in an automobile
accident. The testimony of police officer Watters

certainly does not qualify him as an expert witness.
Although the record discloses that Watters is an
experienced police officer, that in itself does not
qualify him as a physicist or engineer and without
such knowledge his testimony can be given no
weight as to the point of impact." (See also Stuart
v. Dotts, et al., (1949 Cal.) 201 P. 2d 820.)
On the other hand, Mississippi has expressed its repugnance to permitting even a highly trained and experienced accidentologist to opinionate as to point of impa.ct
when the drivers of both vehicles suffered amnesia after
the accident in Hagan Storm Fence Company v. Edwards,
(1963 Miss.) 148 So. 2d 693, 695:
"Where the facts can be produced and presented
to the jury or other trier of facts by direct evidence,
in such a manner that they can have an adequate
basis for formulation of their own decision, without extraneous assistance, opinion evidence (such
as here) should not be admitted. Ordinarily a witness must confine his testimony to matters within
his own knowledge."
Some states have held that when a party seeks to elicit
opinion evidence in the absence of showing the prerequisites for that expert opinion evidence, i. e., necessity, technical and complicated subject matter not within the common knowledge of the jury, impossibility for the jury to
draw its own inferences, etc., then the party seeking such
opinion evidence has failed to establish a proper foundation. North Dakota is the leading state to adopt this line
of reasoning in the case of Fisher v. Zuko (1959 N. D.) 98
N. W. 2d 895, 900:
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"The facts and circumstances disclosed by the
evidence are such that it may be assumed the jury
was capable of understanding them and arriving at
its own conclusion as to where the accident happened without the aid of the opinion of the highway patrolman. Where such a situation affirmatively appears there is no foundation for the expression of an opinion by an expert as to point of
impact. The trial court erred in overruling defendant's objections and denying the motion to strike
the conclusion of the witness on the ground that it
was elicited without sufficient foundation." (See
also Satterland v. Fieber, (1958 N. D.) 91 N. W. 2d
623; Bischoff v. Koenig, (1959 N. D.) 100 N. W.
2d 159.)
Nebraska has also refuted this type of evidence on the basis
of improper foundation in the cases of Barry v. Dvorak,
(1964 Neb.) 126 N. W. 2d 226; Danner v. Walters, (1951
Neb.) 48 N. W. 2d 635. See also Turcotte v. DeWitt, (1954
Mass.) 124 N. E. 2d 241, 245.
The Ohio Supreme Court held in the cases of Dickman
V. Struble, (1957 Ohio) 146 N. E. 2d 636, Roeder v. Fisher's Bakery, Inc., (1963 Ohio) 188 N. E. 2d 78, that the
place of impact of two vehicles is a matter within the experience, knowledge and comprehension of an average layman or juror and not a matter involving an interpretation
of scientific or technical knowledge with which the jury
itself is not supposed to be competent to deal. The court
stated in Dickman that to permit opinion evidence on such
a simple question, even though the facts to be given consideration must be complicated, is to open wide the door
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of speculation by the jury, and to the return of verdicts
based upon illegitimate considerations.
Other courts taking a similar view are: Reed v. Humphreys, (1964 Ark.) 373 S. W. 2d 580 (opinion inadmissible
when facts can be given jury to reach its own conclusion);
Conway v. Hudspeth, (1958 Ark.) 318 S. W. 2d 137; Waller
V. Southern California Gas Co., (1959 Cal.) 339 P. 2d 577
(facts could be shown without opinion on ultimate issue);
MiUs v. Redwings Carriers, Inc., (1961 Fla.) 127 So. 2d
453 (expert opinion not requiring scientific skill or knowledge excluded); Whatley V. Henry, (1941 Ga.) 16 S. E.
2d 214; Presser v. Schull, (1962 Ind.) 181 N. E. 2d 247
(error to admit opinion when jury could determine based
upon eyewitness testimony); Turcotte v. De Witt, (1954
Mass.) 124 N. E. 2d 241 (jury could comprehend facts
without opinion of officer); Delta Chevrolet Co. V. Waid,
(1951 Miss.) 51 So. 2d 443 (jury as well qualified as witness to determine position of vehicle at impact); Duncan
V. Pinkston, (1960 Mo.) 340 S. W. 2d 753 (not proper subject matter of expert or opinion evidence); Stillwell v.
Schmoker, (1963 Neb.) 122 N. W. 2d 538 (all physical
facts before jury and opinion should have been excluded);
Biggs v. Gottsch, (1961 Neb.) 112 N. W. 2d 396, (not
proper subject matter of opinion evidence on cross-examination); Padget v. Buxton-Smith Mercantile Co. (1958
CAlO N. M.) 262 F. 2d 39 (opinion based on skid marks
error since layman can trace and arrive at conclusion);
Kelso v. Independent Tank Co., (1960 Okla.) 348 P. 2d 855
(cause of collision within experience and understanding of
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ordinary person); Giffin v. Ensign, (1956 CA 3 Pa.) 234 F.
2d 307 (jury capable of drawing its own conclusion); Jenkins V. Hennigan, (1957 Tex.) 298 S. W. 2d 905 (jury was
as able to trace skid marks as witness); Venable v. Stockner, (1959 Va.) 108 S. E. 2d 380 (opinion based on common
knowledge inadmissible); Macey v. Billings, (1955 Wyo.)
289 P. 2d 422 (error when jurors competent to draw their
own conclusions); Grayson v. Williams, (1958 CA 10 Wyo.)
256 F. 2d 61 (opinion inadmissable when jury able to draw
its own conclusion).
In the final analysis, expert evidence must take the
form of either of two general classes: (a) The first class
deals with facts, the existence of which are not within the
common knowledge and ordinary intelligence of the lay
person and said facts are peculiarly within the knowledge
of men whose experience or study enables them to speak
with authority concerning these facts. If, in this class of
expert evidence, the jury can form a conclusion or reason·
able inference after the presentation of the facts by the
expert, then it is their sole province to do so. (b) The second class of expert evidence is that situation wherein the
conclusion as well as the knowledge of the facts themselves
depend upon professional or scientific skill not within the
range of ordinary knowledge. In this second class of cases,
not only facts but conclusions to which they lead may be
testified to by experts in opinion form.
The distinction between these two kinds of testimony
is apparent. In the one instance the facts are to be stated
by the expert, and the conclusion is to be drawnJ by the
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jury; in the other, the expert states the facts and may then
give his conclusion in the form of an opinion. Dougherty
v. Millikan (1900 N. Y.) 57 N. E. 757, 759; Presser v. Schull,
(1962 Ind.) 181 N. E. 2d 247, 251.
The instant case did not require the necessity of expert evidence under either of these classes mentioned. The
facts were simple and uncomplicated. The debris from the
accident was light (R. 182). The skid marks, which were
all on the east side of the highway, did not commence until
some distance after the impact when the Robert's car
started its side skid (R. 146). The Robert's car rolled
over after the side skid so that the entire car was damaged.
The defendant's car had a side scrape (R. 185). Relating
these facts to the jury did not require any special skill or
peculiar knowledge. In any event, the jury was as well able
to reach its own conclusion of reasonable inference from
the facts presented as was the patrolman. The conclusion
of the officer was not dependent upon any professional or
scientific skill for a proper inference. It must follow that
the admission of the patrolman's opinion was error.

Assuming the point of impact is a proper subject
matter for expert opinion evidence, is such an opinion admissible when based upon some source other than competent facts?
(2)

Some states have held, under certain circumstances,
that the point of impact or collision in motor vehicle accident cases may be a proper subject for expert or skilled
opinion evidence. Where these opinions are based upon the
expert witness' own knowledge or observations at the acci-
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dent scene as contrasted from opm10ns based upon hyp 0•
thetical questions and assumed facts, the vast majority of
these courts require that the witness show sufficient facts
and knowledge thereof to enable him to form an opinion
entitled to be given weight by the jury. 66 A. L. R. 2d
1062. As a general rule, the expert witness must first state
the facts upon which his opinion is predicated before his
opinion will be admitted. This practice permits the trial
court to exclude opinions based upon insufficient facts or
insufficient knowledge of these facts.
"It is necessary according to the great weight
of authority, that an expert witness giving an opin·
ion upon facts of his own knowledge or based upon
his own observation first testify to the facts upon
which his opinion is based" 20 Am. Jur. § 794.
It was held in Xenakis v. Garrett Freight Lines,
(1954) 1 Utah 2d 299, 265 P. 2d 1007, 1010:

"Yet it is obvious that the court and jury must
be made aware of the facts upon which the expert
bases his conclusion, otherwise the testimony would
be of little assistance, and there would be no way of
testing the validity of his opinions."
Patrolman Sherwood failed to reveal to the jury any
competent facts upon which he based his opinion concerning the point of impact. On direct examination, he discussed the skid marks of the Robert's car, but testified the
skid occurred some distance after impact and on the right
or east side of the highway (R. 177-178); he discussed
the roll over of the Robert's car, but testified it ended up
with the entire vehicle on the east or right hand side of the
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center line (R. 179); and he concluded his testimony by admitting there were no objective signs whatsoever to determine the point of collision (R. 181). On cross examination, he discussed light debris on the road, but did not
identify its location, (R. 182) and he then gave his objectionable opinion as to the point of impact. Certainly those
facts alone constituted little basis for an opinion as to the
point of impact, and if anything, more pointedly inferred
that the impact occurred in the east portion of the highway. Thus, the patrolman must have derived his opinion
from some source other than competent facts, such as hearsay, speculation, or conjecture.
In a number of cases where it appeared that the witness' opinion as to the point of impact was based in part,
at least, upon what others had told him, and not entirely
from his own investigation of the accident scene, it has
been held that the witness' opinion was inadmissible.
Thus, in Jackson v. Brown, (1961 Okla.) 361 P. 2d
270, the court held that the opinion must be derived solely
from an examination of physical evidence found at the
scene, and in Ward v. Brown, (1962 C. A. 10 Okla.) 301
F. 2d 445, the court held that an opinion by an officer
based in part upon statements made by the drivers was
hearsay.
"What the two drivers told him was hearsay
and could not be a proper foundation for opinion
evidence by an expert. Neither were the remaining
physical facts on which he based his opinion such
as to entitle him to give an expert's opinion as to
where the collision occurred."
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California has repeatedly refused to admit opinions as
to the point of impact in accident cases where the opinions
were based in part upon statements made by others. In
Francis v. Sauve, (1963 Cal.) 34 Cal. Rptr. 754, 760, the
court held:
"However, his op1mon as to the point of impact is not admissible when it is based on what
witnesses told him rather than what he himself observed." See also Kalfus v. Fraze, (1955 Cal.) 288
P. 2d 967; Robinson v. Cable, (1961 Cal.) 359 P.
2d 929; Brooks v. Gilbert, (1959 Iowa) 98 N. W.
2d 309.
Those courts that hold the point of impact to be a
proper subject for expert opinion evidence require a careful review of the sufficiency of the facts in evidence be·
fore the opinion is admitted, to insure that the facts sup·
port a rational and intelligent opinion. In Hodges v. Severns, (1962 Cal.) 20 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134, the court stated:
"His fixing of the point of impact was not competently done. He relied upon three elements, debris on the street, skid marks and statements of
'both parties involved' which would mean Hill and
Hislar, who were the drivers involved in the acci·
dent. Debris alone cannot fix the point of impact.
(Waller v. Southern California Gas Company, supra,
339 P. 2d 577.) The skid mark could not suffice
for the officer testified that he could not say
whether it was in lane 2 or not, and did not state
that it began four feet north of the south curb; he
had no recollection of having measured the skid
marks. Statements made by Hislar at some subse·
quent time (and probably to another investigating
officer) were pure hearsay and could not enter in·
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to an admissible opinion as to where the impact occurred."
In the case of Gilbert v. Quintet, (1962 Ariz.) 369 P.
2d 267, 268, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that skid
marks and dust marks on the bumper of one of the vehicles were not competent facts for a police officer to base
his opinion concerning the point of impact.
"An expert may be allowed, in cases where an
expert opinion is appropriate, to interpret facts in
evidence which the jury are not qualified to interpret for themselves. * * * He may base such
an opinion either on his personal observations given
into evidence, * * * or upon assumption that
some portion of the testimony of others already in
evidence is true. * * * He must however, base
his opinion only upon competent evidence. * * *
The officer admitted that he could not form an opinion as to the impact point solely from the skid marks
and dust marks on the bumper of the bus, nor could
such an opinion be admitted where there are insufficient facts in evidence to support a rational and
intelligent opinion."
Similarly, in Fryda v. Vesely, (1963 S. D.) 123 N. W.
2d 345, 348, the court held that the police officer did not
have sufficient knowledge of facts to enable him to form
an opinion.
"Other than stating that he saw some tractortire marks at the accident scene he did not describe
any other physical facts that he observed pertinent
to the point of impact. Even if opinion evidence as
to the point of impact were proper, it is not shown
that 'the witness has sufficient knowledge of facts
to enable him to form an opinion entitled to be given
weight by the jury.' 66 A. L. R. 2d 1062.''
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Also, the Supreme Court of Arkansas refused to permit the opinion of an expert based upon the position of a
guardpost, the length of the truck, gauge marks on the
highway and an examination of the vehicles, in the case
of Little v. George Feed and Supply Company, (1961 Ark.)
342 S. W. 2d 668, 672, holding these facts insufficient to
support an opinion.
"We do not unequivocally hold 'reconstruction'
of an aocident by an expert to be inadmissible when
supported by proper evidentiary facts, but we do
say that the evidence in this case, upon which Snyder's opinion was predicated, was inadequate to
support his conclusions."

In jurisdictions that permit expert opinion evidence as
to point of impact, the sufficiency of the facts upon which
the opinion is predicated may be a variable factor for each
case under consideration. But in no event should the court
accept an opinion in the total absence of competent facts
upon which the opinion is based. It is submitted that patrolman Sherwood did not reveal to the court or jury any
competent facts whieh would enable him to form an opinion as to the point of impact, and there were no facts to
corroborate the opinion given.
Disregarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses as to
where the impact occurred, a reconstruction of the accident scene would reveal that all of the activity and conjes·
tion immediately prior to the accident took place in the
west lane of traffic. The Naismith car was on the west
shoulder of the highway a few feet onto the hard surface
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(R. 344). There were other cars parked on the west side
of the highway south of the Naismith's car (R. 185, 204)
with people standing by their vehicles (R. 186). Clothing
from the Naismith car was stacked in a pile on the west
shoulder just south of the Naismith vehicle (R. 191). Patrolman Sherwood's car was parked on the east side but
completely off the road (R. 140). Some glass remained in
the west lane of traffic from the first accident (R. 341,
345, 224). Patrolman Sherwood was standing on the hard
surface of the road in the west lane of traffic (R. 177, 182)
about 10 feet from the center of the road (R. 179) talking
to Mrs. Naismith (R. 176). Mrs. Naismith was standing
right behind her car (south) on the west side of the road
(R. 211). Mr. Naismith was standing in front of his car
on the west side of the road (R. 199). Mr. Brown was
Rtanding just off the highway to the west by the debris adjacent to the Naismith car (R. 318). Henry Kelly was
standing in the west lane of traffice 6 to 8 feet from the
center of the highway (R. 337) and his son was on the west
side of the road (R. 381, 385) about 200 feet north of the
Naismith vehicle (R. 379, 386). The accident occurred just
south of the Naismith car (R. 204, 346).

Experience would indicate that a driver (Mitchell)
proceeding south in such a congested lane of traffic would
normally and naturally turn to the east out and around the
congested area. Likewise, the northbound driver (Roberts),
with the oncoming vehicle and the people and cars along
the west side of the road clearly in his line of vision, would
hardly be likely to drive into or toward those objects.
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The opinion expressed by the officer did not lend itself
to the fads nor to common experience of the normal and
reasonable reaction of drivers under those conditions. The
patrolman arbitrarily decided to judge for the jury where
the point of impact occurred when he said :
"Q. It could have been on the center line. Is
that correct?"

"A. Could have been, but it was over the cen"
ter line" (R. 189).
The motive for such an opinion was revealed by patrolman Sherwood when he acknowledged that he knew Mr.
Mitchell prior to the accident, (R. 189) and the admission
of the patrolman's opinion .constituted error.
( 3) Assuming the point of impact is a proper subject
matter for expert opinion evidence, was it error for the
court to admit in evidence the opinion of patrolman Sher·
wood after excluding the opinion of Sheriff Jackson?

It should be noted that the court refused to permit
plaintiff's first witness, Sheriff Jackson, to give his "opin·
ion", (R. 43) but, thereafter, permitted patrolman Sher·
wood to give his "judgment" on cross examination by
counsel for defendant, as to the point of impact in spite
of the fact that the patrolman did not see the collision (R.
75) and found no objective sign whatsoever to determine
the point of impact (R. 68).

In McNabb v. Jeppson, (1960 Minn.) 102 N. W. 2d
709, defense counsel similarly elicited opinion evidence from
a police officer on cross examination. In that ease plaintiff
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called a highway patrolman to testify concerning measurements and distances and defendant on cross examination
asked the patrolman's opinion as to point of impact. Plaintiff failed to make a proper objection and the opinion testimony was admitted. Thereafter, plaintiff called an expert
engineer to rebut the officer's opinion evidence as to point
of impact and the court on defendant's objection excluded
this evidence. In reversing, the court held that the case
did not constitute a proper case for expert testimony as
to point of impact but that plaintiff failed to make proper
objection thereby giving the officer's testimony probative
effect. Therefore, the court held that the opinion evidence
of the engineer, while normally inadmissible, should have
been admitted in rebuttal.
"Generally, where a party elicits evidence, he
cannot thereafter be heard to say that such evidence
is not admissible, and where he offers evidence that
certain conditions exist, he cannot complain that
the court permits his evidence to be rebutted. * * *
It is immaterial that the initial inadmissible evidence is brought out on cross examination. * * *
We believe that in the situation here where inadmissible opinion testimony is in evidence and must
be given probative force by the jury, it constitutes
prejudicial error to exclude testimony of a similar
character introduced by the party who is adversely
affected by such testimony."
Conversely, where a sheriff's opinion testimony is excluded by the court and not given probative force by the
jury, it should constitute prejudicial error to admit testimony of a similar character given by a highway patrol-
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man, introduced by the party who objected to the previous
opinion testimony.

If the admission of the highway patrolman's
opinion was error, was such error prejudicial?
( 4)

After culmination of the trial, the jury was asked to
find whether defendant was negligent by driving left of
the center of the highway under special verdict 1 (b). This
was the issue upon which the case turned. After 8 hours
of deliberation six of the jurors found "No preponderance
of the evidence." The opinion of the highway patrolman
upon this subject, given as a witness occupying an official
position, must have greatly impressed the jury in its finding, particularly since the average layman undoubtedly
would be inclined to place great weight upon testimony by
a highway patrolman. The test to be applied in determining the prejudicial effect of the erroneous testimony is
stated in Joseph v. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital,
(1957) 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330, 333.
"if, * * * the error appears to be of such
a nature that it can be said with assurance that it
was of no material consequence in its effect upon
the trial because reasonable minds would have arrived at the same results, regardless of such error,
it would be harmless and the granting of a new
trial would not be warranted. On the other hand,
if it appears to be of sufficient moment that there
is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such
error a different result would have eventuated, the
error should be regarded as prejudicial and relief
should be granted."

The prejudicial effect of erroneously permitting an
officer to give his opinion as to the point of impact in an
accident case was discussed in Padgett v. Buxton-Smith
Mercantile Company, (1958 CA 10 N. M.) 262 F. 2d 39,
42. Thete, the court found that skid marks, debris and
damage marks on the vehicles did not require scientific
skill or know ledge for an expressed opinion as to the point
of impact and such an opinion thereon was as much within
the knowledge and competence of a lay juror as a highway
patrolman. The court held the error was prejudicial in the
following language :

"* * * While we are loathe to interfere
with the broad discretion of the trial courts in matters of this kind, the opinion came from an officer
of the law whose badge of authority gave it evidential significance which may not be dismissed as
harmless or non prejudicial. As an official opinion
of a fact matter within the knowledge or comprehension of members of the jury it carries a weight
which tends to usurp the judicial function. It is
indicative, we think, of what appears to be a constantly growing tendency in cases of this kind for
an investigating officer to assume the prerogative
of assessing liability. This is the responsibility of
the trier of the facts."
Other courts have expressed themselves in a similar
language. In Carmody v. Aho, supra, the court said:
"In a case such as this is, the impact of such
testimony upon the jury easily can be a determining factor. We think that it was prejudicial error
to admit it."
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Also in Presser v. Schull, (1962 Ind.), supra, the court
held:
"The very fact that the court permitted officer
Jarrett to express his opinion gave weight to his
testimony tending to cause the jury to substitute
the opinion of the investigator for the opinion of
the jury." (See also Maben v. Lee, (1953 Okla.)
260 P. 2d 1064, 1067; Kelso v. Independent Tank
Company, (1960 Okla.) 348 P. 2d 855, 858; Chester v. Shockley, ( 1957 Mo.) 304 S. W. 2d 831; Beck.
man v. Schroeder, supra; Fisher v. Zuko, supra;
Jackson v. Brown, supra; Hadley, et al. v. Ross,
(1944 Okla.) 154 P. 2d 939.)
In the case of McNelley v. Smith, (1962 Colo.) 368 P.
2d 555, 558, the court discussed the prejudicial effect of
erroneously permitting an officer to give his opinion as to
how plaintiff got into the south bound lane of traffic.
"The officer's testimony placed the stamp of
authenticity upon Schaefer's testimony and by implication branded the McNelley testimony as false.
Under these circumstances it was error to permit
the officer to express his opinion * * * "
It can be said with reasonable assurance that patrol-

man Sherwood's opinion was of material consequence in
the outcome of the trial. The effect of admitting his testimony after excluding Sheriff Jackson's opinion was to indicate to the jury court approval of the patrolman's opinion and thereby cause the jury to give greater weight to his
testimony. By implication it tended to brand the testimony
of plaintiff's four eyewitnesses as false, and created serious and sober confusion in the minds of the jury as to
which vehicle had crossed the center line. As an official
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opinion of a fact matter, it carried a weight which could
easily have been the determining factor in the trial. Therefore, the error should be regarded as prejudicial and a new
trial granted.
CONCLUSION
The jury found that plaintiff had been damaged in
excess of $66,000.00 as a result of the injuries she received
from the accident. After an exhaustive eight hours of deliberation in an attempt to determine which vehicle had
crossed the center line of the highway, six members of the
jury were unable to conclusively return a finding on this
question and answered the special verdict "no preponderance". Two of the jurors agreed with plaintiff's version.
The point of impact was not a proper subject matter for
expert opinion evidence nor were there competent facts in
evidence upon which such an opinion might be based. In
any event, it would seem that fair play would not permit
the patrolman to give unfavorable opinion evidence while
not allowing favorable evidence of the same nature to be
given by the sheriff. Plaintiff should not be governed by
one set of rules and defendant by another.
Plaintiff, therefore, earnestly submits that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and plaintiff,
in the furtherance of justice, should be granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
WILFORD A. BEESLEY,
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Salt Lake City, Utah
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